This study investigates how ownership structure impacts on the corporate performance of listed firms in China. The study uses sample data of firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for the five year fiscal period that ended 2005. The results of the panel data regression analysis suggests firm performance to have positive and significant relation with the proportion of shares held by the institution, through the legal person holding companies. In addition, while state ownership indicates negative influence on performance, individual and foreign investors are found to have positive effect on performance, though at a minimal levels. Interestingly, the effect of ownership structure is stronger in firms experiencing the dominance of legal person share holdings over state shares. Further, firm size and ratio of debt to equity are also observed to have influence on the performance of Chinese listed firms. These findings are of great significant to policymakers, academics, shareholders and other stakeholders.
Introduction
Since the work of Jensen and Meckling, (1976) , corporate governance has been widely studied in an effort to mitigate the agency problem, resulting from the separation of ownership and control. Emerging markets face serious agency problem, as a consequence to poor governance stemming from weak legal and other institutional systems. Ownership structure has been recognized as a control mechanism in monitoring the activities of the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) . A number of researchers have demonstrated evidence, though largely from the matured economies, on the significant of ownership structure to the value of the firm (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Grossman and Hart, 1980) . However, the issue as to how ownership structures impact the performance of firms in emerging markets such as China, a country with a unique institutional framework, still remains a challenge that beckons for attention. The need to investigate the impact of ownership structure of Chinese listed firms is imperative, considering the significant influence of the Chinese economy on the global economy. Understanding how ownership structures impact on Chinese firms would assist policymakers, investors and other stakeholders in making informed decisions. Since the official opening of China to the outside world in the late 1970s, the country has undergone massive economic reform, leading to consistent double digit GDP growth in recent years. Prior to the restructuring of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), virtually all Chinese enterprises were hampered by gross inefficiency, perhaps stemming from the overbearing influence of the state on the activities of these firms. Soon after, and without radical changes in ownership structure, China began the process of reforming the SOEs towards a market-oriented system. Under this philosophy the state began transforming SOEs from loss-making cost centers into profitable, return-oriented investment centers organised on competitive-market principles encompassing both the manufacture of products and acquizition of the required factors of production (Rawski, 1994) . The approach adopted by China in the reform of SOEs, is a departure from the ownership-privatization approach widely adopted in Russia and other parts of Eastern Europe (Rawski, 1994 and Boycko et al., 1996) .
Although the market-oriented approach, as adopted by the Chinese Government, has helped in fostering economic growth, the system has failed to show any signs of enhanced efficiency, and thus an improvement in the overall performance of the SOEs. Their poor performance was conceivably due to their prior ownership structure, which may have resulted in managers lacking the authority to properly govern their company described as the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Xu and Wang, 1999) . Managers in Chinese listed firms enjoy control of only a small fraction of the companies' shares. Laws require share ownership to be concentrated in the hands of legal persons defined as domestic institutions, state and domestic individuals or institutions. As part of the new requirements to list on the stock exchange, managers of state-owned listed companies now possess autonomy in decision making, with regard to the activities of the firm. Although this has delivered some improvement agency problems persist, and these stem from the separation of ownership and control. The question remains of how to deal with the present agency problem in firms where the state retains a significant interest? A solution is urgently needed that will support managers power to act in the best interests of the state and other stakeholders as well.
In the current study, the effects of agency problems are investigated by using firm performance as the dependent variable influenced by a variety of ownership structures thought to embody differing levels of agency problems. Chinese firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges form our research sample as we closely examine the effect of the proportion of shares held by the legal persons and state shareholders on firm performance. In our study, we hypothesize that ownership structure has an impact on the performance of Chinese listed firms. We focus our study on this aspect of corporate governance because of the significant effect the proportion of shares held by each category of shareholder could have in the external monitoring and control of listed firms. Our study contributes to the growing governance literature, which argues that ownership structure has a significant influence on firm performance (Denis and McConnell, 2003; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Specifically, we employ panel data that controls for firm specific unobserved heterogeneity and aggregate macroeconomic shocks. In the investigation, we found ownership structure, concentrated in the hands of legal person, state and domestic individuals or institutions, to have a significant impact on firm performance measures such as return on equity, Tobin Q and return on assets.
The ownership structures of listed firms in China have some unique characteristics. This might stem from the fact that most listed companies are restructured stated owned enterprises (SOEs). Chinese shares are categorized into two broad groups that is, the A-shares, which are the domestic shares for domestic or institutional investors and the B, H and N shares, for the offshore investors. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we review some related literature. Section 3 describes the sample data and methodology used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical results and discusses the implications of these results, section 5 concludes the paper.
Literature review
Theoretical and empirical studies, especially in Western countries like the US and the UK have emphasized the need for good corporate governance (Denis and McConnell, 2003; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Studies in multiple countries provide evidence of the importance of corporate governance by examining the critical relationship between ownership structure and firm performance.
In modern corporations, the separation of ownership and control gives rise to the much researched principal-agent problem that may lead to poor performance due to the weakness of corporate governance systems (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Distribution of ownership of the firm through shareholdings is a major influences on firm performance.
Literature on corporate governance has identified two types of corporate ownership structures, these being: dispersed ownership and concentrated ownership structures. In firms where the ownership structure is dispersed, shareholders may lack the incentive to monitor the activities of management; they may also find it difficult if not impossible to monitor the activities of the agent (management). Grossman and Hart (1980) report that shareholders in widely dispersed companies lack adequate incentives to closely monitor management. Monitoring the agents in dispersed firms generates costs that might not be commensurate with the derived benefits. With most developing countries such as China ownership and control is concentrated. Studies demonstrate that large shareholders are likely to play an active role in ensuring compliance with corporate governance standards (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Denis and McConnell, 2003; Khanna and Yafeh, 2005) . Thus, concentrated ownership structures provide better incentives to monitor the activities of managers. The ability of large shareholders to monitor managers may in turn lead to superior firm performance, from which the shareholders stand to benefit.
However, monitoring management is associated with agency costs, which may erode the benefits accruable to minority shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Thus small shareholders are unlikely to make the effort involved in such monitoring.
Empirical research, essentially from the mature market economies and emerging markets, provide evidence, though with mixed reports, on the effect of ownership on firm performance (Denis and McConnell, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Xu and Wang, 1999; Choe and Yin, 2000) . In one such study Holderness and Sheehan (1988) noted that performance of publicly quoted firms rises with an increase in ownership concentration. In a sample of 114 firms quoted on the New York and American stock exchanges, Holderness and Sheehan (1988) observed Tobin Q and accounting profits to be significantly lower for firms where individuals form the majority of owners than for firms where a corporate body forms the majority owner. In another study, Boardman and Viming (1989) closely analyze and compare private, mixed enterprises and SOEs of the 500 largest non-U.S. industrial firms. In their report, they found mixed enterprises and SOEs to perform worse than similar private enterprises. While Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) found a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance, McConnell and Servaes (1990) in their sample of 1000 firms, report Tobin Q to have positive correlation with institutional shareholdings. In contrast, Demestz and Lehn (1985) in a study of 511 large corporations, found no significant correlation between ownership concentration and accounting profit.
Furthermore, Wu et al., (1996) in a study of Chinese publicly quoted companies, found ownership concentration to have an inverse U-shape with firm performance. Firms with large shareholders, especially in developing countries, are believed to be favorably disposed in terms of improvement in value, perhaps due to the ability of concentrated shareholders to monitor the activities of the management. Xu and Wang (1999) 
Sample Data and Methodology
The sample for this study consists of firms listed on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for the period 2001 to 2005. The sample selection was based on data availability. We also presume listed firms to operate and prepare their records in accordance with the rules and regulations as prescribed by the regulatory bodies. In addition, our sample is limited to listed firms due to the fact that data on ownership distribution and performance are not publicly available for firms that are not listed in the stock exchange. Also excluded were firms in the financial industry due to the nature of their financial statements. Furthermore, firms not listed on either stock exchange before the accounting year-end for 2000 and those undergoing a reorganization during the sample period were also excluded. The study is based on data reported as at 31 December each year and was made up of 3,512 firm-year observations, and these are shown in Table 1 . Table 1 . Number of firms in the sample for the year Data concerning ownership structure and firm performance were collected and computed from firms' annual reports as published by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE), Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and other regulatory bodies. In addition, necessary ratios were computed from the reports of individual firms. To supplement and confirm the data from these reports, key officials both at the stock exchanges and individual firms were interviewed.
This study investigates the relation between ownership structure and performance of Chinese listed firms. The study hypothesizes a positive (or negative) correlation between legal person (state), tradable A-shares and the performance of publicly listed companies. To examine this relationship, we used the pool data regression model. Specifically, we estimate the following regression equation:
Where: α = the intercept, β = Regression coefficients and µ = the error term PERF ij = Performance of firm i in year j {Return on equity (ROE), Return on assets (ROA) and Tobin's Q} OS ij = Ownership structure of firm i in year j {Proportion of shares held by legal person (P_LP), state (P_STATE), domestic (Chinese) individual or institutional investors (P_T_A-shares), employees (P_EMP) and foreign investors (P_FOR)}. DER ij = Debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, in year j and FSIZE ij = Firm size of firm i, in year j INDDUM ij = Industry dummies of firm i, in year j and YRDUM ij = Year dummies of firm i, Firm performance is measured in three different ways to enable us to establish variation, if any, in the relation between ownership structure and firm performance. As a result of data availability, we focus on ROE, ROA and Tobin Q as measure of firm performance. Return on equity, is measure of the percentage of net income to the book value of common equity. Return on assets, is computed as the percentage of net income to the book value of total assets and Tobin Q is measure as market value of equity capital plus the book value of firm's debt divided by the book value of total assets. This measure of Tobin's Q is employed due to the unavailability of many years of data in China used to estimate the replacement costs of assets. Our estimation of Tobin's Q is consistent with Ehikioya (2008) 
In the regression analysis, the explanatory variable is the ownership structures, which comprise P_LP, P_STATE, P_T_A-shares, P_EMP and P_FOR. We measure P_LP as the proportion of shares held by the legal person to the total number of shares. P_STATE is measured as the proportion of shares held by the state to the total number of shares. We measure P_T_A-shares as the total number of tradable A-shares to the total number of shares. Both P_EMP and P_FOR are measured as the proportion of shares held by employees and foreign investors respectively, divided by the number of outstanding shares.
Apart from ownership structure, other factors may also influence performance. To control for such factors, we introduce FSIZE, DER, INDDUM and YRDUM. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets and controlled for size effect. Debt to equity ratio is measured as the book value of total debt, divided by the book value of total assets. To control for industry effect, we introduce an industry dummy, taking the value of one if the firm i has in industry j and zero otherwise. To control for macroeconomic shocks that may stem from the environment over time, we include year dummy variable that equals one for year j and zero otherwise. In our regression analysis, to check whether our results are sensitive to alternative specifications, we used three different performance variable measures of ROE, ROA and Tobin's Q. We included the industry and year dummies in our analysis, though their coefficients are however not reported, since they are only included as control variables. We begin by examining the impact of ownership structure on performance. The results for the pooled regressions are reported in Table 3 with significance at 1% and 5% levels. Column 1 of the table reveals the regression results when ownership distribution is regressed with ROE. As shown in Column 4, a similar set of results is obtained when ROA is used. In Column 7, we excluded some variables so as to observe if there could be possible changes in the direction of the relationship, however, the results remain the same. Generally, with the exception of state ownership that has a significant negative relation with performance, the results show a significant positive association between the proportion of legal person, domestic individual or institutions ownership structure with firm performance. The positive relationship between employees, offshore and performance is however insignificant suggesting no influence. The values in parentheses are t -values and a, +, * denotes 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively
Results and Discussion
The negative relation between state and performance may be due to the inefficiency of state management procedures. These may be explained by government's interest in pursuing political objectives such as maximum employment in these firms rather than profit maximization. In addition, the conflict of interest between government with its political agenda and shareholders who are strongly prefer profit maximization may affect the performance of management. The significant positive relationship between legal persons, domestic individual or institutions with performance demonstrate the motivation and ability of a concentrated ownership structure to monitor and influence the activities of the firm's management. Legal persons with substantial interest therefore improve firm performance through direct control from the board.
In contrast, the coefficients of debt to equity ratio show a significant negative correlation with performance. This might be due to the fact that highly leveraged firms tend to perform poorly (Xu and Wang, 1999) . Another explanation may be that because debt in China is mainly supplied by government controlled institutions. The use of debt by SOEs from government controlled institutions may lead to lack of drive on behalf of the SOE's management to push the company to perform well. It also suggests that there may be a substantial influence of interest rate costs of debt in firm performance. Firm size is also found to have a significant positive relationship with firm performance. This indicates that larger firms perform better than smaller firms, perhaps because of favorable government policies to protect the larger SOEs, or significant economies of scale. Additionally, the improved performance shown may be due to the ability of larger firms to attract support to undertake large, positive net present value investments.
In Table 4 , we examine on one hand, the relationship between the proportion of legal person in the investment structure against performance, and on the other, we investigate the correlation between the proportion of state ownership with firm performance. In Column 1, the coefficient of LP is significantly positively related to firm performance, measured as the firm's ROE. This suggests the ability of LP to monitor and influence the activities of management. Column 2 of the same table shows state proportion of ownership to have a significantly negative relationship with performance, indicating the inefficiency of firms in which the state has a greater control. In addition, when alternative measures of performance shown in Column 3 and 4, are applied, the results are still the same. In Column 5 and 6, we excluded industry and year dummies to see if there would be any change in the direction of the relationship. We found that although there is no noticeable change in LP, the coefficient on state ownership shows a positive relationship with firm performance. However, the result is statistically insignificant and thus may have no real influence on firm performance. The coefficients for firm size, and debt to equity ratio, are almost the same for the entire regression analysis in the table. The results provide further evidence on the positive influence of firm size on firm performance in different industry and year. Superscripts a, +, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
The values in parentheses are t -values
In China, most listed firms are characterized as having a mixed ownership structure with the legal persons, state and domestic individuals or institutional investors as major shareholders with dominant interests. In this study, we examined too the influence of LP or State dominance on performance. In other words, we investigate the effect of the dominant ownership structure on firms' performance where LP or state has the dominant holding. To examine this effect, we selected 48 firms where the LP is dominates and another 48 firms where the state is dominates. Both selections had 144 firm-years observations. Empirical results are presented in Table  5 and 6. As reported in Table 5 , firms dominated by LP indicate ownership concentration to be significant at the1% and 5% levels. Thus, there is a strong positive relationship between ROE and LP. Also, we found ROA to have a significant positive correlation with the proportion of shares held by LP, in LP dominated firms. Although Tobin's Q still showed a positive relationship with LP, the level of relation is however, low compare with the results from ROE and ROA. Superscripts a, +, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
On the other hand, for state dominated firms, ROE and ROA strengthen the negative association with an increasing proportion of shares held by the state. The result is however, differs from the relationship between Tobin's Q and state ownership, as this relationship is insignificantly positively correlated. In all, the empirical results for A-shares, employees, offshore, debt-to-equity ratio, and firm size are similar to those reported in Table 3 and 4. Generally, positive ownership concentration is felt more in firms dominated by LP than in firms dominated by the state. This again shows the policy direction of the government to pursue social interest in contrast to LP that is strongly seeking profit maximization. In keeping with this difference in management priorities, operating inefficiency is also greater in government controlled firms.
Conclusions
The persistent advocacy for corporate governance across the globe has valuable insights for the study of ownership structure effects on the performance of firms in emerging markets. Since the late 1970s, when China formally opened up to outside markets, the country has been through many reforms, which have included the re-restructure of most SOEs. The unique institutional framework of China has through this restructure, generated consistent double digit GDP growth in recent years. The study used sample data of firms listed on the SHSH and SZSE for the period 2001 to 2005, covering this period of rapid expansion, to investigate the impact of ownership structure on the performance of Chinese listed firms. Overall, empirical evidence in this study demonstrates that ownership structure certainly does matter in China, and perhaps, in other emerging markets.
The results of our investigation suggest the need for ownership concentration, but, not in the hands of the state, as inefficiencies related to the state ownership severely reduce firm performance. To ensure efficiency and improvement in performance, there is a need for government to reduce its equity shareholdings in listed firms. In addition, it is also recommended the state to should establish an effective monitoring, control and incentive system to ensure that the managers act in the best interest of the investors. Specifically, the proportion of legal person and domestic individual or institutional shareholdings are found to be positively and significantly associated with improved firm performance. Thus, ownership concentration should largely be in the hands of institutions and individual investors with incentives to monitor and influence the activities of the management. Although the results show employees and foreign shareholdings too have positive effect on performance, the influence found is insignificant. The stronger positive effect of ownership concentration in LP dominated firms over state dominated firms, again raises the question as to the efficiency of adopting dispersed ownership in emerging markets, such as China. Furthermore, it shows the need for the state to reduce its controlling interest in order to ensure a higher level of firm performance.
In addition to ownership structure, other factors such as size, and debt to equity ratio, are found to be significant in determining firm performance. While firm size is found to have a significantly positive relationship with performance, debt to equity ratio is found to have a significantly negative correlation with firm performance. This suggests that debt to equity ratio is an impediment to increasing the value of the firm. Although this study may not be completely free from research bias, we have systematically demonstrated the impact of ownership structure on performance of Chinese listed firms. Thus, we suggest further studies to take account of SOEs yet to be listed in the stock market. The inclusion of other performance and control variables would also merit further consideration.
